Abstract-Privacy-preserving data publishing is to protect sensitive information of individuals in published data while the distortion ratio of the data is minimized. One well-studied approach is the -anonymity model. Recently, several authors have recognized that -anonymity cannot prevent attribute disclosure. To address this privacy threat, one solution would be to employ -sensitive -anonymity, a novel paradigm in relational data privacy, which prevents sensitive attribute disclosure. -sensitive -anonymity partitions the data into groups of records such that each group has at least distinct sensitive values. Existing approaches for achieving -sensitive -anonymity are mostly generalization-based. In this paper, we propose a novel permutation-based approach called anatomy to release the quasi-identifier and sensitive values directly in two separate tables. Combined with a grouping mechanism, this approach not only protects privacy, but captures a large amount of correlation in the microdata. We develop a top-down algorithm for computing anatomized tables that obey thesensitive -anonymity privacy requirement, and minimize the error of reconstructing the microdata. Extensive experiments confirm that anatomy allows significantly more effective data analysis than the conventional publication methods based on generalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of privacy-preserving data publishing has received a lot of attention in recent years. Privacy preservation on relational data has been studied extensively. A major category of privacy attacks on relational data is to re-identify individuals by joining a published table containing sensitive information with some external tables modeling background knowledge of attackers. Most of existing work is formulated in the following context: several organizations, such as hospitals, publish detailed data (also called microdata) about individuals (e.g. medical records) for research or statistical purposes.
Privacy risks of publishing microdata are well-known. Famous attacks include de-anonymisation of the Massachusetts hospital discharge database by joining it with a public voter database [10] and privacy breaches caused by AOL search data [3] . Even if identifiers such as names and social security numbers have been removed, the adversary can use linking [9] , homogeneity and background attacks [5] , [11] , [12] to re-identify individual data records or sensitive information of individuals. To overcome the re-identification attacks, the mechanism of -anonymity was proposed [8] , [9] . Specifically, a data set is said to be -anonymous ( ≥ 1) if, on the quasi-identifier (QI) attributes (that is, the maximal set of join attributes to re-identify individual records), each record is identical with at least ( − 1) other records. The larger the value of , the better the privacy is protected.
Although -anonymity has been well adopted, Traian et al. [11] , [12] showed that a -anonymous table may still have some subtle but severe privacy problems due to the lack of diversity in the sensitive attributes. In particular, they showed that, the degree of privacy protection does not really depend on the size of the QI-groups, which contain tuples that are identical on those attributes. Instead, it is determined by the number of the distinct sensitive values associated with each equivalence class. To overcome the weakness in -anonymity, they proposed the notion of -sensitive -anonymity. Its purpose is to protect against attribute disclosure by requiring that there be at least different values for each sensitive attribute within the records sharing a combination of QI attributes. For instance, Table  II is a 2-sensitive 2-anonymous view of Table I since in each QI-group, there are at least two distinct Disease values.
The main approaches used to achieve anonymity in the previous work are based on generalization or suppression [9] , [4] , [5] , which assumes that each attribute has a corresponding conceptual generalization hierarchy or taxonomy tree. A lower level domain in the hierarchy provides more details than a higher level domain. For example, Zip Code 4350 is a lower level domain and Zip Code 435 * is a higher level domain. Such hierarchies are suitable for numerical attributes as well. In particular, a hierarchical structure is Job Age Sex Zip Code Disease  clerk  23  M  1100  HIV  manager  37  M  2300  Fever  clerk  61  F  3400  Flu  worker  69  F  4350  HIV  worker  41  M  4435  Flu  technician  58  M  5340  Fever   Table I Table II .
A. Defects of generalization schema
Although generalization preserves privacy, it often loses considerable information in the microdata, which severely compromises the accuracy of data analysis. Assume that the Table II was released, and that a researcher wants to derive  from this table an To illustrate how to process the query, Figure 1 shows a 2D space, where the -, -dimensions are Age and Zip Code, respectively. Each point denotes a tuple in the microdata of Table I . For example, the -, -coordinates of point 1 equal the age and Zip code of tuple 1, respectively. Rectangle 1 (or 2 ) is obtained from the generalized values in the first (or second) QI-group in Table II . For instance, the x-(y-) projection of 1 is the generalized age [20, 60](Zip code [1000, 6000]) of tuples 1,2,5,6. Query A is represented as the shaded rectangle , whose projection on the -( -) dimension is decided by the range condition Age ≤ 40 (1000<Zip code<2000).
Since the researcher sees only 1 and 2 (but not the points), s/he answers query A in a way similar to selectivity estimation on a multidimensional histogram [6] , as suggested in [4] . Clearly, as 2 is disjoint with , no tuple in the second QI-group can satisfy the query. 1 , however, intersects , and hence, is examined as follows. From the Disease in Table II , without additional knowledge, the researcher assumes uniform data distribution in 1 , and computes probability that a tuple in the QI-group qualifies the range predicates of A as
1. This value leads to an approximate answer 0.2, which, however, is five times smaller than actual query result 1.
The gross error is caused by the fact that the data distribution in 1 significantly deviates from uniformity. Nevertheless, given only the generalized table, we cannot justify any other distribution assumption. This is an inherent problem of generalization, which prevents an analyst from correctly understanding the data distribution inside each QIgroup.
B. The anatomy approach
The idea of the anatomy approach is that if two tables with a join attribute are published, the join of the two tables can be lossy and this lossy join helps to conceal the private information [15] .
We could like to make use of this idea to derive a new mechanism for achieving a privacy principle -sensitive -anonymity. For example The two tables share the attribute of Group ID. If we join these two tables by the Group ID, it is easy to see that the join is lossy and it is not possible to derive the Table V after the join. The result of joining is shown in Table  X . From the anatomy, each sensitive value is linked to at least 2 values. Therefore, the required individual privacy 2-diversity is guaranteed (formal proof given in Section 4). Also, in the joined C. Contribution and paper organization [11] proposed to generate one generalized table which satisfies -sensitive -anonymity by full domain generalization. Due to the defects of generalization-based approach, we propose a novel permutation-based approach, called "anatomy", with which the privacy protection for -sensitive -anonymity can be achieved by releasing the quasi-identifier and sensitive values directly in two separate tables. In the two tables, one table contains the undisturbed non-sensitive values and the other table contains the undisturbed sensitive values. We show that the results are better than previous approaches in the experiments.
The rest paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some basic concepts for privacy protection. In Section 3, we discuss -sensitive -anonymity model and illustrate how to anonymize the microdata with -sensitiveanonymity requirement by the permutation-based approach. We propose an efficient top-down algorithm for -sensitive -anonymity with anatomy in Section 4. The extensive experimental studies are included in Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES Let be the initial microdata table and
′ be the released microdata table.
′ consists of a set of tuples over an attribute set. The attributes characterizing microdata are classified into the following three categories.
• Identifier attributes that can be used to identify a record such as Name and Medicare card.
• Quasi-identifier (QI) attributes that may be known by an intruder, such as Zip code and Age. QI attributes are presented in the released microdata table ′ as well as in the initial microdata table .
• Sensitive attributes that are assumed to be unknown to an intruder and need to be protected, such as Health In what follows we assume that the identifier attributes have been removed and the quasi-identifier and sensitive attributes are usually kept in the released and initial microdata table. Another assumption is that the value for the sensitive attributes are not available from any external source. This assumption guarantees that an intruder can not use the sensitive attributes to increase the chances of disclosure. Unfortunately, an intruder may use record linkage techniques [13] between quasi-identifier attributes and external available information to glean the identity of individuals from the modified microdata. To avoid this possibility of privacy disclosure, one frequently used solution is to modify the initial microdata, more specifically the quasi-identifier attributes values, in order to enforce the -anonymity property.
Definition 1 (Quasi-Identifier): A quasi-identifier (QI) is a minimal set of attributes in microdata table that can be joined with external information to re-identify individual records (with sufficiently high probability).
Definition 2 ( -anonymity):
The modified microdata table ′ is said to satisfy -anonymity if and only if each combination of quasi-identifier attributes in ′ occurs at least times. A QI-group in the modified microdata ′ is the set of all records in the table containing identical values for the QI attributes. There is no consensus in the literature over the term used to denote a QI-group. This term was not defined when -anonymity was introduced [7] , [10] . More recent papers use different terminologies such as equivalence class [14] and QI-cluster [11] , [12] .
For example, let the set {Job, Birth, Zip Code} be the quasi-identifier of Table III. Table IV is one 2-anonymous  view of Table III since there are two QI-groups and the size of each QI-group is at least 2. So -anonymity can ensure that even though an intruder knows a particular individual is in the -anonymous microdata table , s/he can not infer which record in corresponds to the individual with a probability greater than 1/ .
III. -SENSITIVE -ANONYMITY WITH ANATOMY
Let us re-examine the objectives of -sensitiveanonymity. With -anonymity, we want to make sure that when an individual is mapped to some sensitive values, at least − 1 other individuals are also mapped to the same sensitive values. With -sensitive, we want to make sure that the diversity of the sensitive values is at least . For example, consider an individual with (clerk, 1975, 4350) Table IX: SS table   Job  Birth Zip Code  Disease  Group ID  clerk  1975  4350  HIV  1  manager  1955  4350  HIV  1  clerk  1975  4350  Flu  1  manager  1955  4350  Flu  1  clerk  1955  5432  Flu  2  worker  1955  5432  Flu  2  clerk  1955  5432  Fever  2  worker  1955  5432  Fever  2  worker  1975  4350  Flu  3  technician  1940  4350  Flu  3  worker  1975  4350  Fever  3  technician  1940  4350  Fever  3   Table X: Resulting join table   Table III , with 2-sensitive 2-anonymity property, since s/he is mapped to the first and the second tuple in Table IV sensitive table (NSS table) , containing all the non-sensitive attributes together with QI-group IDs in , and (2) the other table, called sensitive table (SS table) , containing the QIgroup ID and the sensitive attributes. The released tables are annotated with the remark that each tuple in each of the two published table corresponds to one record in the original single table. This is to ensure that a user will not mistakenly join the two tables and assume that the join result corresponds to the original table.
The schema of the non-sensitive table (NSS table) and  the sensitive table (SS table) This shows that the privacy protection provided by the single anonymous table is no stronger than that provided by the NSS and SS tables in terms of -sensitive -anonymity. Since satisfies -sensitive -anonymity, tables NSS and SS also satisfy -sensitive -anonymity. ■ For better understanding, the example shown in Tables IV to X demonstrates the ideas of the proof above. If we publish Tables VI and VIII, we can achieve similar privacy preservation objectives as we publish Table IV only.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section empirically evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of the anatomy approach for -sensitiveanonymity. We first clarify the settings of our experi- Experiment Setup: We adopted the adult data set for the experiment, which can be downloaded in the UCIrvine Machine Learning Repository 2 . We eliminated the records with unknown values in this data set. The resulting data set contains 45,222 tuples. Nine of the attributes were chosen in our experiments, as shown in Table XI . From adult dataset, we create a set of microtables, in order to examine the influence of dimensionality. The set contains 5 tables, denoted as adult-3, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , adult-7, respectively. Specifically, adult-d (3 ≤ ≤ 7) treats the first attributes in Table  XI We implemented our proposed algorithm, the -sensitive -anonymity based privacy preservation by anatomy. Let us denote it as ( , ). We compared the proposed topdown algorithm with the original algorithm of -sensitive -anonymity [11] which generalizes the QI and forms one generalized table only. Let us denote the algorithm by ( , ). We also compare our algorithm with the stateof-the-art algorithm in [4] , which adopts multi-dimension 2 http://www.ics.uci.edu/mlearn/MLRepository.html.
recoding. We denote it as ( , ). Recall that each QI value is generalized and the last two columns of Table XI describes how these QI attributes are generalized.
By default, we set = 2, = 20. For adult-d tables, distributes from 2 to 10, and ranges from 5 to 30. The utility of an anonymization technique is evaluated in terms of effectiveness for aggregate queries. The effectiveness of aggregate query is defined to be its average relative error in answering a query of the following form. In the above query, Unknown-Microdata is an original data set or an anonymized data set. The query dimensionality denotes the number of QI attributes to be queried and denotes the sensitive attribute. For instance, if the microdata is adult-3 and = 2, then { 1 , 2 } is a random 2-sized subset of {Age, Work Class, Education}. For any attribute , the predicate ( ) has the form ( = 1 OR = 2 OR = ), where is a random value in the domain of , for 1 ≤ ≤ . The value of depends on the expected query selectivity : = ⌈| | ⋅ 1/( +1) ⌉, where | | is the domain size of . If the value of is set higher, the selection conditions in ( ) will be more. We compare the anonymized tables generated by different algorithms in terms of average relative error, which is defined as follows. We perform the aggregate query with the original data set, called Original. That is, Let us call the count obtained above . We execute the aggregate query with the anonymized data set as follows. As algorithm ( , ) generates two tables, namely NSS and SS, we perform the query as follows. Figure 2 plots the error of all methods as a function of , for datasets adult-d. From the Figure 2 , we can see that ( , ) gives a lower average relative error compared with the other two algorithms ( , ), ( , ). This is because algorithm ( , ) does not generalize the table but algorithm ( , ) generalize the table, which makes the average relative error higher, and its accuracy decays severely as the dimensionality increases, which confirm the analysis in [1] .
Next, we examine alternative techniques on queries involving different number of QI-attributes. Figure 3 demonstrates the results for adult-5. Again, the error of anatomy is consistently small, whereas generalization-based approaches are again the worst techniques. Figure 4 present the error as a function of query selectivity . It can be found that the average relative error of all three algorithms decreases when increases. This is because, when is larger, each attribute in the aggregate query involves more value matches. That means the actual count is larger. Note that the actual count is the denominator of the average relative error. Besides, if the generalized values in the anonymized table match more aggregate values in the query, the estimated count will be more accurate. Thus, the overall average relative error decreases when increases. Figure 5 examines the accuracy as varies. As expected, the error of anatomy-based and generalization-based increases with , because more data distortion is needed in order to enforce stronger privacy control. Similar results are plotted by varying in Figure 6 . Finally, Figure 7 presents the results under different dataset cardinalities . We found that the average relative error of all three algorithms decreases slightly when increases. This is because, when is larger, there is more chance that a tuple can be matched with an existing tuple in the data without much generalization. Similarly, algorithm ( , ) gives a lower average relative error compared with algorithm ( , ) and ( , ). The effectiveness of each method remains fairly stable at all cardinalities.
Efficiency of the algorithms: Having tested the effectiveness of anatomy-based approach for data analysis, we proceed to evaluate its efficiency. Figure 8 compares the time of anonymization required by ( , ), ( , ) and ( , ) on the dataset with different cardinalities . The computing overhead of ( , ) is less than the other two generalization-based approaches, since there is no generalization cost. Similar results are shown in Figure 9 , where the the experiments are carried out shows by varying for all three algorithms.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a -sensitive -anonymity based privacy preservation mechanism that reduce information loss by the anatomy approach. Instead of publishing one generalized table, we generate two tables with a sharing attribute called Group ID, which corresponds to a unique identifier of a "QI-group". One table contains the detailed information of the quasi-identifier and Group ID, and the other table contains Group ID and the sensitive attribute. By avoiding the generalization of the quasi-identifier in the first table, we achieve less information loss. We conducted extensive experiments and verified the improvement on effectiveness on data analysis and efficiency in execution time.
This work also initiates several directions for future investigation. For example, in this article, we focused on the case where there is a single sensitive attribute; extending our technique to multiple sensitive attributes is an interesting topic. Another direction is to apply this permutation-based approach to other privacy principles, and make comprehensive experimental studies to show its effectiveness and efficiency.
